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INTRODUCTION 
 The age of information is upon us; the most private information is no longer beyond 
detection.  The consequences of this open access to personal information can be devastating and 
Congress has responded by enacting numerous statutes to protect individual privacy, including 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  This Act has special relevance to attorneys involved in debt 
collection.  Attorneys are frequently called on to recover a debt owed to their clients from third 
parties.  Sometimes the attorney takes on the case from the beginning and seeks a court order 
obligating a defendant to pay; some attorneys will be asked to collect on a debt that has already 
been reduced to judgment or that has simply been referred for collection.  As reality has shown 
time and again, the first step for an attorney in either circumstance is usually to decide whether 
the defendant’s ability to pay the debt makes pursuing collection worthwhile.  Determining if the 
defendant is judgment proof without wasting too much in resources is in the best interests of both 
the attorney and the client.  There will also be situations where a defendant has disappeared and 
the attorney needs to locate him in order to initiate litigation or collection efforts.  In any case, 
the attorney might want to obtain the defendant’s credit report (more accurately called a 
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consumer report)1 as a starting point for debt recovery.  Attorneys may also desire consumer 
reports for a myriad of other reasons in litigation unrelated to debt collection.  Although a 
consumer report can be a valuable tool for any attorney involved in debt recovery, it is 
imperative that the attorney understands the limitations and obligations imposed on the use of 
these reports by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.2  Ignorance of these requirements can have 
harmful consequences for both the attorney and the individual on whom the report was obtained.  
Misuse of a consumer report by an attorney leaves the individual at risk for invasions of privacy, 
including the devastating crime of identity theft, and also exposes the attorney to potential 
criminal and civil liability.3 
 Although there is a wealth of case law interpreting the Act, there is little consensus across 
jurisdictions on its application to issues that particularly impact on debt-collecting attorneys.  
Additionally, many of the existing cases have serious analytical problems because the courts 
have misinterpreted or ignored the precise language of the Act, relevant Congressional intent, 
and administrative determinations.  Furthermore, recent amendments to the Act have called into 
question the underlying assumptions behind numerous cases that were favorable to debt 
collectors.  This article attempts to highlight the major issues that attorneys may face when 
recovering money for their clients and the potential legal hazards that exist under the current 
state of the law.  Part I will address the legality of obtaining consumer reports under the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, including a discussion of the definition of consumer reports and the 
purposes for which they may and may not be used by attorneys.  Part II will summarize the 
various types of liability that can result from misuse of these reports, including actions for both 
civil and criminal enforcement of the Act 
. 
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I.  THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT – CONSUMER REPORTS, PERMISSIBLE PURPOSES AND 
ATTORNEYS 
 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) is primarily a consumer protection law that 
strictly regulates the circumstances under which a consumer report may be obtained and how that 
report may be used.  The industry for gathering personal information has experienced explosive 
growth and shows no signs of slowing down.  The largest, nationwide credit bureaus, Equifax, 
Trans Union, and Experian (formerly TRW), alone generate over one billion consumer reports 
per year.4  Only an estimated 57.4 million reports go to the actual consumer that was the subject 
of the report.5  These reports may include a consumer’s sensitive personal information, like 
name, age, Social Security Number, home and business addresses, employment information, 
previous addresses, spouse’s name, estimated income, value of car and home, bank accounts, 
credit accounts, payment history, mortgages, and public records, such as tax liens, bankruptcies, 
and judgments.6  Protecting the confidentiality of this information has been the major theme of 
the FCRA’s legislative history.7  Recently, in 2003, Congress adopted the Fair and Accurate 
Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)8 which amended the FCRA to add more consumer protections 
and specifically combat the growing threat of identity theft.9 
  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the administrative agency that has authority to 
promulgate rules and regulations under the Act.10  In 1990, the FTC published on Official Staff 
Commentary regarding the FCRA,11 and it has also on occasion published Staff Opinion Letters 
illuminating its interpretation of the provisions.  Although not binding in court, these resources 
have been found very persuasive and they will be referenced throughout this article. 
A.  What is a Consumer Report? 
The first step in understanding the limitations of the FCRA is to know precisely what a 
consumer report is and what it is not.  This is critical because when information is considered a 
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consumer report, it is subject to the FCRA and may only be used for specific, enumerated 
purposes.12  However, if the information is not a consumer report to begin with, the information 
may be used for any purpose subject to common law civil liability.  Unfortunately, the task of 
determining what is a report subject to the FCRA is made quite difficult because the definition of 
consumer report is intertwined with the listing of permissible purposes for which the reports may 
be used.  Therefore, in defining consumer report, the two provisions must always be read 
together.     
A consumer report is defined as any communication of information by a  
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit 
standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or 
mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in 
part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility 
for--(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes; (B) employment purposes; or (C) any other purpose 
authorized under section 1681b of this title.13 
Section 1681b of the FCRA is the statute that lays out the permissible purposes for which 
a consumer report may be used.  There are only two of the twelve purposes14 that are particularly 
relevant for the debt collecting attorney and, therefore, they are the only provisions which will be 
discussed in this article.  The relevant purposes can be broadly described as follows: collection of 
a consumer account and in connection with a consumer-initiated business transaction.  These 
broad descriptions are what generally appear in court opinions and will still ring true in many 
jurisdictions.  However, the generality of these labels is hopelessly imprecise when the exact 
words of the statute are read as a whole.  Section 1681b(a) provides 
any consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under the 
following circumstances and no other: (3) To a person which it has reason to 
believe--(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction 
involving the consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving 
the . . . collection of an account of, the consumer; or . . . (F) otherwise has a 
legitimate business need for the information--(i) in connection with a business 
transaction that is initiated by the consumer . . . .15 
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Both of these sections invoke several terms of art that must also be defined before the 
meaning of consumer report starts to emerge.  First, the FCRA defines “consumer” as “an 
individual.”16  Next, a “consumer reporting agency” is any individual or entity that “regularly 
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit 
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to 
third parties.”17  Additionally, “credit” is defined in the FCRA by reference18 to the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act which states “‘credit’ means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer 
payment of debt or to incur debts and defer its payment or to purchase property or services and 
defer payment therefore [sic].”19  Finally, “account” is now also defined by reference20 to the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act which describes an account as “a demand deposit, savings deposit, 
or other asset account (other than an occasional or incidental credit balance in an open end credit 
plan as defined in section 1602(i) of this title), as described in regulations of the Board, 
established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”21  Notably, an “open end 
credit plan” is essentially a standard consumer credit card, which is excluded from the definition 
of account when the balance is “occasional or incidental.”22 
For a debt collection attorney, there are a number of key points that are locked away in 
these less than artfully drafted provisions.  The most important rule that emerges is the FCRA 
does not apply to reports dealing with the credit characteristics of businesses;23 it only applies to 
such reports on natural persons.  Additionally, information that would normally be a consumer 
report can only be designated as one if the information is initially obtained from a consumer 
reporting agency.24  It has never been questioned that the national credit bureaus, Experian, 
Trans Union and Equifax, are consumer reporting agencies.  It is also important to note that if the 
report is initially obtained from a consumer reporting agency, it does not lose its status as a 
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consumer report by virtue of being passed through an intermediary to its ultimate user.25  For 
example, if a client obtains a consumer report illegally and then passes it on to his attorney, both 
the client and the attorney may be liable for violations of the FCRA.26  It is no defense for the 
attorney that she did not obtain the report directly from a consumer reporting agency.27    
Additionally, information is only a consumer report if it is collected by the consumer 
reporting agency for an enumerated permissible purpose, the consumer reporting agency expects 
the information to be used for such a purpose, or if it is actually used for such a purpose.28  
Defendants in FCRA litigation have tried to avoid liability by claiming that the Act did not apply 
to their actions if they used a report for an impermissible purpose because it then no longer fit the 
definition of a consumer report.29  In recent years, courts have rejected this argument under the 
plain terms of the definitional statute which looks beyond just how the report was used.30  This 
means that a court must generally examine the motives of the consumer reporting agency in any 
action under FCRA to determine whether a report can be classified as a consumer report.  The 
impact of these inquiries will be mixed because consumer reporting agencies jealously guard 
against revealing their internal methods and trade secrets.  Therefore, the record is often sparse 
on the topic leaving courts to make uninformed judgments.31  However, the FTC has revealed its 
thinking in a Staff Opinion Letter where it concluded that a listing of credit cards held by a 
consumer without more information was a consumer report.32  The letter stated this information, 
“[w]hen in the files of a credit bureau, . . . is, at the very least, information collected in whole or 
in part for the purposes set forth” in the FCRA.33  Therefore, it is prudent for any attorney to 
assume that what is traditionally thought of as an individual’s “credit report,” is always going to 
be a consumer report that is subject to the FCRA, especially when obtained from one of the 
nationwide credit bureaus.  This means that attorneys must be sure they are going to use the 
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report for a permissible purpose or they will be exposing themselves to liability under the FCRA.  
Additionally, a “likelihood of collection score” obtained from Experian is also considered a 
consumer report.34 
As noted previously, the definition of a consumer report is intertwined with the 
permissible purposes for which consumer reports may be used.  These purposes include 
determining eligibility for (1) consumer credit or insurance, (2) employment purposes or (3) 
other purposes authorized by section 1681b.35  The relevant purposes will be discussed in much 
greater detail below, but it will suffice for now to note that in the text of the statute the word 
“eligibility” actually modifies all three purpose descriptions.  It is hard to say whether this was 
intentional as it leaves the provision sounding awkward but the legislative history suggests that 
the need to regulate access to consumer reports for determining eligibility for credit, insurance 
and employment was the main motive behind adopting the FCRA.36  Unfortunately, this portion 
of the statute is circular in that it defines a consumer report by reference to the uses for which a 
consumer report may be used.  This rotating logic has wreaked havoc in court decisions 
interpreting at least one permissible purpose that is particularly relevant to attorneys, the business 
transaction provision.37 
Furthermore, it is extremely important to note that the definition of consumer report goes 
further than merely credit information.  The FCRA says that information may be a consumer 
report when it bears on at least one of the other listed criteria, namely “character, general 
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.”38  It is recognized that this is a very 
broad standard that covers a wide variety of information, like driving records, employment 
history, criminal records, and even the existence of child support obligations.39  It is likewise 
important to be aware that just because information appears in the public record, it is not immune 
 9
from being considered information that creates a consumer report.40  Finally, it has been said that 
a report that contains solely the name and address of an individual is not a consumer report 
because it does not bear on any of the criteria listed in the statute.41  
B.  How May Consumer Reports Be Used by Attorneys? 
It should be apparent from the preceding section that Congress intended the definition of 
consumer report to be very expansive and to cover the most sought after information about 
individuals.42  This was necessary to effect the FCRA’s goal of protecting the privacy of the 
consumer.  What will also become apparent in this section is that Congress wanted to strictly 
limit access to this information by narrowly prescribing the circumstances under which these 
reports may be disseminated and used.  Unfortunately for the consumer, courts have not looked 
carefully enough at the limiting statutory language and have allowed access to consumer reports 
in situations that Congress likely did not intend.  This section will serve both a summary of the 
current law that is applicable for debt collecting attorneys and also attempt to underline the 
weaknesses of the current approach taken by the majority of jurisdictions.  Moreover, the recent 
FACTA amendments have further undermined the validity of current interpretations of the 
FCRA.  Although courts have been slow to catch the true meaning of the FCRA, this article 
should place attorneys on guard that their current practices in obtaining consumer reports may 
actually be contrary to the law and that existing authority may soon change. 
1.  Consumer Report Used In Connection With a Credit Transaction Involving the 
Collection of the Consumer’s Account 
 
The first permissible, and most prevalent, purpose cited with respect to debt collection 
allows for a consumer report to be used “in connection with a credit transaction involving the 
consumer on whom the information is to be furnished and involving the . . . collection of an 
account of, the consumer.”43  This provision has historically been understood to allow an 
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attorney to obtain a consumer report to collect a debt related to a credit account, but not to collect 
a general business debt unless it has been reduced to judgment.44  If the use could be justified 
under this provision, then courts would allow the consumer report to be used to both find the 
debtor and determine whether the debtor had sufficient assets to satisfy the debt.45  However, 
courts have been loose with their analysis that this purpose is only valid when it relates to a 
credit transaction, and they have allowed this provision to be used to collect on many types of 
debts without even discussing the “credit transaction” language.  For example, courts have 
allowed consumer reports to be obtained to collect on debts for medical services,46 debts caused 
by breach of a business contract that was made subject to a mechanic’s lien,47 college tuition 
debt,48 and debts that are not even specified.49   
Additionally, even the FTC has been less than precise regarding the importance of the 
debt arising from a credit transaction.  In the Official Staff Commentary, the FTC stated that 
collection agencies have a permissible purpose to “receive a consumer report on a consumer for 
use in attempting to collect that consumer’s debt, regardless of whether debt is assigned or 
referred.”50  In the same paragraph, the FTC goes on to say that an “attorney may obtain a 
consumer report . . . for use in connection with a decision whether to sue that individual to 
collect a credit account.”51  It is unlikely the FTC really interpreted this provision as imposing a 
double standard between collection agencies and attorneys, but it does highlight the common and 
imprecise way in which the “credit transaction” language has been referenced.  Another 
inconsistency is found in a FTC Staff Opinion Letter which states that an attorney for a 
residential landlord may not obtain a consumer report on a tenant that vacated his apartment 
without paying the rent.52  The Opinion Letter specifically states that this is not a credit account 
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which would give rise to the permissible purpose.53  With the authorities in such a state of 
conflict, it is not surprising that courts have had difficulty correctly interpreting the FCRA. 
Another significant FTC interpretation of the FCRA is the so-called “judgment creditor 
theory.”  In the Official Staff Commentary, the FTC states without qualification that a “judgment 
creditor has a permissible purpose to receive a consumer report on the judgment debtor for use in 
connection with collection of the judgment debt, because it is in the same position as any creditor 
attempting to collect a debt from a consumer.”54  Again, there is a noticeable lack of discussion 
about the debt arising from a credit transaction.  Despite this, the judgment creditor theory has 
been whole-heartedly accepted by some courts.55  As always, there is one important caveat; if the 
judgment debtor is a business, consumer reports may not be obtained by the individual owners of 
the business if they are not personally liable for the business’ debts.56 
The case law and FTC interpretations on the “judgment creditor theory” suggest there 
was an underlying assumption that because there was a debtor, there must be a creditor.  The 
assumption continues that if there was a creditor, there would be a credit transaction that would, 
in turn, give rise to a permissible purpose under the statute.  Prior to 2003, this assumption may 
have been fueled by the lack of a definition of the term “credit” in the FCRA.  As previously 
mentioned, the adoption of FACTA brought important changes to the FCRA.  Most notably, 
Congress chose to define both “credit” and “account” for the first time within the FCRA itself.57    
Only two cases to date have been reported that take into account the first of these 
amended provisions.  First, in Miller v. Trans Union, L.L.C., the court flatly rejected the 
judgment creditor theory in the context of court-ordered child support payments.58  The Northern 
District Court of Illinois held that the new definition of credit, which includes the granting of a 
right to defer payment, did not apply to court-ordered payments which lacked any element of a 
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consensual transaction.59  Furthermore, it rejected the FTC’s interpretation as being decided prior 
to the 2003 amendments and “no longer persuasive.”60  The Court emphasized that “individuals 
who do not consent to a transaction deserve greater, not lesser, privacy protections under the 
FCRA.”61  Indeed, this sentiment is fully consistent with the legislative intent of the FCRA to 
protect individual privacy while still allowing for freedom of access to information where 
appropriate in credit transactions.62 
Shortly after Miller v. Trans Union, L.L.C. was decided, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n and came to the same conclusions.63  In 
Pintos, the debtor’s car was towed and impounded.64  The towing company obtained a lien on 
her car for the costs of towing and later sold the car to satisfy the debt.65  The sale did not cover 
the full debt, so the towing company transferred the deficiency claim to a collection agency 
which obtained the debtor’s consumer report.66  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit ruled “FACTA 
makes clear that debt collection is a permissible purpose for obtaining a credit report under 
section 1681b(a)(3)(A) only in connection with a ‘credit transaction’ in which a consumer has 
participated directly and voluntarily.”67  This transaction did not satisfy the new definition of 
credit because it arose by statute and did not involve voluntary consumer participation.68  The 
Ninth Circuit also explicitly recognized that “[n]ot all ‘debt’ involves a ‘credit transaction.’”69 
It is somewhat surprising that with all the focus on FACTA’s new definition of “credit,” 
the courts in Miller and Pintos failed to notice another new definition, that of the word 
“account.”70  Since the collection efforts have to be related to “an account of . . . the consumer”71 
in order to have a permissible purpose under this section, the absence of any discussion of this 
new definition is quite noticeable.  The definition of account is quite limited and includes only “a 
demand deposit, savings deposit, or other asset account [including credit cards with regular 
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balances] . . . established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”72  Reading the 
two definitions together appears to leave a permissible purpose open only to true creditors who 
become so by consent of the consumer debtor and who are seeking to collect on a personal credit 
card or from a personal savings, checking or other type of bank account.   
With no court or FTC interpretations on this provision to date, it is difficult to tell 
whether this narrow definition in conjunction with the Miller and Pintos line of reasoning will 
completely invalidate section 1681b(a)(3)(A) as an avenue for most debt collection efforts.  
However, if one views the legislative intent as attempting to protect individual privacy by 
broadly defining what a consumer report is and narrowly circumscribing the situations in which 
it may be released and used, the suggested outcome is not at all absurd.  Nevertheless, for the 
time being, debt collectors outside of 7th and 9th Circuits can continue to rely on the expansive 
interpretation given to section 1681b(a)(3)(A) by the courts and the FTC.  However, the debt 
collecting attorney will want to pay careful attention to the continuing validity of the judgment 
creditor theory in her jurisdiction in order to best serve her client while still avoiding personal 
liability for improperly obtaining a consumer report.73 
2.  Consumer Report Used By Attorney With Legitimate Business Need and In 
Connection With a Consumer-Initiated Business Transaction 
 
 The other most widely used FCRA provision by attorneys allows for a consumer report to 
be obtained when the user “has a legitimate business need for the information--(i) in connection 
with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer . . . .”74  This purpose usually gets 
raised by attorneys who are not yet directly involved in debt collection, but who are preparing to 
go down that road, i.e. preparing for litigation relating to a debt. 
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  a.  The Problem With the Current Construction of “Business Transaction” 
 As it was in the previous section, imprecision is the name of the game when it comes to 
interpreting this provision.  As a result of its dual status as both a permissible purpose under 
section 1681b and also as part of the definition of consumer report in section 1681a(d), courts 
have struggled to differentiate between the analyses applicable to each distinct role.75  Language 
from cases interpreting the definitional section have been used as rationale to support cases 
decided solely on the existence of a permissible purpose where the presence of a consumer report 
was never disputed.  For example, in Houghton v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co., the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a report produced by Equifax that detailed an 
individual’s activities since the date of an accident, past health history, and general financial 
information for purposes of an insurance company’s investigation into the personal injury claim 
of that individual did not fall within the definition of a consumer report.76  The holding was 
based on the fact that the information was not used, collected for or expected to be used for 
determining the individual’s eligibility for any benefit named in the FCRA, like insurance, credit 
or employment.77  The court went on to adopt a narrow view of the “business transaction” 
purpose with respect to its role in defining a consumer report by ruling that the only business 
transactions that would be covered are those that are “related to one of the other specifically 
enumerated transactions . . . , i.e., credit, insurance eligibility, employment, or licensing.”78  The 
court further summarized this requirement by stating there must be a “consumer relationship . . . 
between the party requesting the report and the subject of the report.”79  Though agreeing with 
the outcome, the concurrence prophetically voiced its concern that this “limited construction” 
given to the business transaction section “in connection with the definition of consumer report” 
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would carry over in the analysis “of the section in which it appears,” namely the permissible 
purposes section.80   
 Indeed, cases have arisen that rely on the definitional analysis from Houghton when the 
true issue of the case was whether a permissible purpose existed to obtain an individual’s credit 
report, which is almost always a consumer report under the FCRA.81  The Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals has recognized this conundrum regarding the interplay of the two provisions and 
concluded that when considering whether information fits the definition of a consumer report, 
the restrictive interpretation of the “business transaction” language, as set forth in Houghton, 
should control.82  However, the permissible purpose section does stand on its own and when the 
existence of a consumer report has been confirmed, the understanding of the “business 
transaction” section can be loosened.83  This is perfectly logical because when solely looking to 
the permissible purposes section, the narrow interpretation of “business transaction” becomes 
redundant since the limiting uses (credit, insurance, employment, etc.) are already contained 
elsewhere within the same section.  There would have been no need for Congress to create a 
“catch-all provision” that could only catch purposes already covered.  Furthermore, it is not even 
clear that the Houghton rule is a sound one given that it purports to restrict the definition of 
consumer report when Congress clearly intended the definition to be all-encompassing and the 
same redundancy problem appears when this provision is considered as part of the definitional 
section because credit, insurance and employment are also already listed within that section. 
 Furthermore, any discussion of the FTC Staff Commentary is conspicuously absent from 
these cases.  This may not be that surprising since they are basically in direct conflict.  Although 
not binding, the Commentary has been widely used in interpreting the “collection of a consumer 
account” provision and it provides useful guidance for untangling the opinions under this 
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provision as well.  The FTC begins by stating the “issue of whether credit, employment, or 
insurance provides a permissible purpose is determined exclusively by reference” to the other 
subsections of section 1681b(a)(3).84  This supports the claim that Congress did not intend this 
provision to include or be repetitive of the other specifically enumerated purposes.  The FTC 
continues that a business transaction is a “transaction with a consumer primarily for personal, 
family or household purposes” and not transactions purely for commercial purposes.85  Again, 
there is no obvious intent to limit the purposes to those already enumerated but reinforces the 
understanding that purely business transactions are not covered.  Finally, the FTC summarizes 
the provision as providing a permissible purpose to obtain a consumer report “for use in 
connection with some action the consumer takes from which he or she might expect to receive a 
benefit that is not more specifically covered” by another subsection.86  Examples of these 
transactions include applying to rent an apartment, paying for goods with check, applying for 
checking or savings account, and seeking to participate in a computer dating service.87  These 
commentaries simply do not support any attempt to link a business transaction as a permissible 
purpose to the limiting words in the definitional section.  However, the FTC has provided a 
different limitation on the meaning of this permissible purpose in a Staff Opinion Letter.  
Specifically, the FTC commented that the only legitimate business need to obtain a consumer 
report in connection with a “new business transaction is to determine the consumer’s 
‘eligibility’” for the transaction.88  If this is the correct interpretation of this permissible purpose, 
it is doubtful that it can serve as the basis for most requests by attorneys for consumer reports 
once a relationship already exists between the debtor and an attorney’s client.  
The importance of this discussion cannot be overlooked by the attorney who seeks to rely 
on cases interpreting the “business transaction” purpose to obtain a consumer report.  The result 
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of the courts’ confusion in interpreting these two different pieces of the statute is that the 
analytical basis of much of the case law on the permissible purpose piece is not supported by the 
text of the FCRA or the FTC Commentary.  This may cut both ways for attorneys depending on 
which side they are on in the FCRA claim.  Many of the cases decided under this section have 
ruled there was no permissible purpose based on the imprecise analysis discussed above; 
attorneys seeking to avoid these cases can argue the decisions did not correctly interpret the 
statute.  However, these lawyers should be wary of the FTC Commentary as it might be used 
against them in the absence of case law.  Furthermore, attorneys seeking to rely on cases that did 
find a permissible purpose under the business transaction section should also be closely watching 
for developments in their jurisdictions that would render those decisions moot.  Nevertheless, the 
cases on this topic are still recognized by the courts as good law and examples of the application 
of this purpose to uses made by attorneys will be discussed next.   
  b.  Examples of Attorneys’ Uses of Consumer Reports under this Provision 
As a refresher, the FCRA language provides a permissible purpose to obtain a consumer 
report if the user has a “legitimate business need . . . in connection with a business transaction 
that is initiated by the consumer.”89  Generally, litigation itself is not a business transaction so a 
plaintiff cannot always rely on this provision to determine whether a defendant can pay a 
judgment or for preparation for a trial or deposition.90  However, the underlying events that gave 
rise to the claim may provide a permissible purpose if the events constituted a consumer-initiated 
business transaction.91  For example, if the litigation results because a debt was created through 
such a business transaction, a permissible purpose may be found if the litigation is about the 
debt.92  Disregarding any of the analytical problems discussed in the previous section, this line of 
cases may be very important to the debt collecting attorney given the possibility of a sea change 
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under the “collection of a consumer account” purpose which would not allow for consumer 
reports to be obtained for collection of basic business debts.93  
Importantly, litigation arising from a tort does not supply a permissible purpose under 
this section.94  Additionally, there may be limits on the time that is allowed to pass before a 
business transaction that was at one time initiated by a consumer can no longer be so classified.  
For example, in a Staff Opinion Letter, the FTC concluded that even though a landlord has the 
right to obtain a consumer report when a prospective tenant applies to rent an apartment, the 
landlord may lose that right when the tenant vacates the premises without paying and the 
landlord is seeking the information to determine if the tenant is worth suing “long after the 
transaction commenced.”95  In addition to the passage of time, a change in circumstances may 
also render a business transaction purpose impermissible.  In Smith v. Bob Smith Chevrolet, Inc., 
the debtor purchased a car from the dealership which obtained his consumer report after a 
dispute had arisen over the amount the debtor owed to the dealership.96  Although the dealership 
could have obtained the debtor’s consumer report with respect to the initial financing of the car, 
the true purpose of the dealership in obtaining the report when it did was to determine if it could 
collect an additional sum from the debtor over what they had already agreed to; this was 
determined not to be a consumer-initiated transaction.97 
This provision has also been frequently and unsuccessfully invoked in divorce litigation.  
In Cole v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., a soon-to-be ex-husband obtained a 
consumer report on his spouse in order to assist his accountant and divorce lawyer in tracking 
missing joint marital assets.98  The husband argued that the report was obtained in connection 
with a business transaction because the divorce was deciding “money and property issues.”99  
The court rejected this argument and also held that it made no difference that the report also 
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contained information relating to the husband since he was clearly after information about the 
wife.100  The Cole court also relied on several other cases that have disallowed this type of use 
under the business transaction section.101   
Furthermore, consumer reports may not be obtained under this section “solely for use in 
discrediting a witness at trial or for locating a witness.”102  Nor may they be used by one attorney 
to impugn another attorney’s credibility in court.103  Finally, it is worth noting that just a general 
desire to investigate someone’s background is not a permissible purpose under the FCRA.104  
The limited application of the business transaction purpose indicates that it is generally not 
fruitful ground for the debt-collecting attorney in litigation, unless the pending litigation is 
actually about collecting on the debt.  Even then, it is still not crystal clear if that sort of use is 
really in keeping with the spirit of the FCRA as interpreted by the FTC.  
If eligibility for consumer transactions was at the forefront of Congress’ thinking when 
drafting the FCRA, attorneys have an obligation to respect that intent and should not take 
advantage of oversights made by Congress or the courts.  It is worth noting as well that a 
standard credit report of an individual may not be the panacea that many attorneys think it is.  
Although consumer reporting agencies undoubtedly have the ability to unearth unlimited 
amounts of personal information, a basic credit report will not show much more than a listing of 
credit accounts and payment histories, along with prior and current addresses.  This type of 
information may assist an attorney in locating someone if it was up to date, which is unlikely if 
the consumer is seeking to avoid debt collectors.  However, the information will only be 
inferentially helpful in determining whether a consumer has sufficient assets to pay a debt.  It 
may establish that the consumer is so far in debt that the current collector can decide not to waste 
the time pursuing him.  Short of this, however, the credit report will not tell the collector what 
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assets the individual has or where they can be found.  It is imperative that the attorney have an 
understanding of what information he is hoping to glean from the credit report and determine if 
there are more effective alternatives for detection105 because the courts have not looked 
favorably upon attorneys who obtain consumer reports in violation of the FCRA. 
II.  ATTORNEY LIABILITY FOR MISUSE OF A CONSUMER REPORT 
 A thorough understanding of the permissible purposes for which consumer reports may 
be obtained is essential because failure to comply with those provisions can expose the user to 
both civil and criminal liability.  The FCRA provides a civil cause of action against users of 
consumer reports who do not have a permissible purpose to obtain the report and who act 
willfully, knowingly or negligently.106  The FCRA also imposes criminal liability on users who 
knowingly and willfully obtain a consumer report under false pretenses.107  The FCRA preempts 
most common law tort claims108 and state statutory claims109 relating to consumer reports so the 
federal provisions are the predominant way to establish any liability for improper use of 
information governed by the FCRA.110 
A.  Civil Liability under the FCRA 
There are three kinds of civil liability created in the FCRA.111  The first provides for the 
recovery of actual damages or statutory damages, ranging from $100 to $1,000, when a user 
willfully fails to comply with any requirement of the act, including obtaining a report for an 
impermissible purpose.112  Both punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs are also allowed 
under the act for this type of violation.113  For many years, willful noncompliance with the FCRA 
required that the user have actual knowledge that her conduct violated the statute.114  However, a 
recent Supreme Court opinion has overturned those cases in part by expanding the definition of 
willfulness to cover reckless disregard of a statutory duty in addition to knowing violations.115  In 
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order for a user of a consumer report to satisfy this recklessness standard, it must be shown that a 
“reasonable reading of the statute’s terms” would reveal the violation and that there was a 
“substantially greater” risk of a violation occurring than if the conduct was merely negligent.116  
The existence of any case law or FTC guidance on the violation is relevant to this analysis.117  
This ruling may have important consequences for attorneys who use consumer reports supplied 
by third parties.  For example, in one case an attorney hired a private investigator who obtained a 
consumer report on an ex-spouse in post-divorce litigation to set aside alimony. 118 This purpose 
is not permitted by any provision of the FCRA and is addressed by numerous cases.  The court 
ruled the attorney did not willfully violate the FCRA because he had no part in acquiring the 
consumer report and no knowledge of how the private investigator obtained it.119  Under a 
reckless disregard standard, the failure of the attorney to inquire about how the consumer report 
was obtained may have created liability on his part given that there is no support for the use he 
made of the report being a permissible purpose.  In fact, the authorities are so stacked against this 
use being permissible, it is possible the attorney consciously ignored the risk of the violation 
which amounts to more than mere negligence. 
The second type of civil liability allows for recovery of the greater of the consumer’s 
actual damages or statutory damages of $1,000 when the report is obtained under false pretenses 
or knowingly without a permissible purpose.120  Again, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and 
costs are also allowed for this type of violation.121  While the first category of liability could be 
predicated on any violation of the Act, this form of liability is only concerned with the existence 
of a permissible purpose.  Indeed, having a permissible purpose is a complete defense to liability 
under this provision.122  Furthermore, the recklessness standard applicable to the first type of 
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liability does not carry over into this provision which requires actual knowledge of a lack of 
permissible purpose or the use of false pretenses.   
Generally, false pretenses exist when a person knowingly obtains a consumer report for 
an impermissible purpose and fails to disclose his true motivation to the consumer reporting 
agency.123  False pretenses may not be found when the user had a permissible purpose to obtain 
the report but lied about it when making the request.124  One court has ruled that users can not be 
held civilly liable if they believed they had a proper purpose at the time of the request but were 
later found to be erroneous by the court.125  The same court also noted, however, that attorneys 
may be held to a higher standard in determining what they knew at the time the report was 
obtained.126  An important factor in any false pretenses claim is that consumer reporting agencies 
are required to obtain a certification from the user that the information will be used in 
compliance with the FCRA.  Specifically, the user must identify herself, certify the purpose for 
which the information will be used, and certify that it will be used for no other purpose.127  
Furthermore, the consumer reporting agency is obligated to disclose the responsibilities of the 
user under the Act, including what constitutes a permissible purpose.128  These requirements 
make it difficult for a user who made a false certification to claim that she was unaware of the 
permissible purposes under the act and, thus, makes it fairly easy to establish false pretenses.129 
Users may also be able to avoid liability under this provision by relying on the assurances 
of the consumer reporting agencies that certain types of information are not consumer reports 
and, therefore, not covered by the FCRA’s permissible purposes.130  However, this sort of 
reliance could potentially serve as the basis for a claim of willful violation, as discussed above, 
or a negligent violation.  Moreover, there is another variety of liability included within this 
second type.  In addition to being liable directly to the consumer, a user that obtains a consumer 
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report under false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible purpose may also be liable to the 
consumer reporting agency from which it obtained the report.131  This liability extends to the 
actual damages sustained by the agency or $1,000, whichever is greater.132 
Finally, the third type of civil liability created by the FCRA is for a negligent failure to 
comply with any requirement of the act and a successful consumer can recover actual damages, 
attorneys’ fees and costs.133  It should be noted that there are no statutory or punitive damages 
provided for a negligent violation.  Negligence claims are most frequently brought against 
consumer reporting agencies for their failure to strictly comply with the FCRA’s procedural 
requirements.134  These claims are not often brought against users of reports because the plaintiff 
has to prove actual damages in order to be successful and such damages may be difficult to 
prove.  
Actual damages can be shown when a consumer has been denied credit or offered credit 
on less favorable terms because of the FCRA violation.135  For example, a landlord requiring a 
consumer tenant to pay a higher amount for a security deposit can support a claim for actual 
damages.136  Additionally, a consumer who refrains from applying for credit because of her fear 
of being turned down may establish actual damages.137  A large component of actual damages 
may consist of mental or emotional distress, including humiliation, if adequately supported by 
evidence.138  For instance, one court held that a plaintiff’s statements, corroborated by her son, 
that the improper use of her consumer report caused her to cry, become “hysterical, panicky, and 
an ‘emotional wreck,’” and led to anxiety, an inability to sleep, and depression were enough to 
survive summary judgment on the issue of actual damages.139  Another court ordered a remitter 
from a jury award of $100,000 to $25,000 for a negligent violation of the FCRA when the only 
evidence was the plaintiff’s testimony of his embarrassment and deep emotional distress.140  In 
 24
another case, an actual damage award of $61,500 was allowed to stand when the plaintiff 
claimed mental distress and contribution to marital problems.141  Finally, loss of reputation can 
also constitute actual damages.142 
Punitive damages are authorized as deemed appropriate by the court for willful or 
knowingly violations of the FCRA.  Courts will generally award punitive damages when the 
conduct was in willful or wanton disregard of the plaintiff’s rights,143 or involved willful 
concealments or misrepresentations.144  There is no requirement that the defendant must have 
acted with malice or an evil motive to justify an award of punitive damages.145  Furthermore, an 
award of actual damages is not a prerequisite for punitive damages; punitives may be awarded 
when the plaintiff has only recovered statutory damages.146  Punitive damages can be a very 
attractive reason to bring an available FCRA claim because the awards routinely go well into the 
five-figure dollar range.  Some examples include: punitive damage award in the amount of 
$10,000 in addition to purely statutory damages;147 awards of $5,000 in punitive damages to each 
of three plaintiffs who also received $500 each in compensatory damages;148 assessment of 
$15,000 in punitive damages and no actual or statutory damages;149 and an actual damage award 
of $2,500 coupled with punitive damages of $25,000.150  
In addition to the allowance of actual, statutory and punitive damages, all successful 
FCRA plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys’ fees and court costs.  To be successful, the 
plaintiff must have secured some type of damage award, though actual damages need not be 
proved in a claim for a willful or knowing violation.151  However, in an action for a negligent 
violation of the FCRA, a plaintiff must prove actual damages in order to be entitled to fees 
because actual damages are the only type of relief allowed by that provision.152  It is also worth 
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noting that generally injunctive relief is not allowed under the FCRA, however, the courts have 
split on this issue.153 
B.  Criminal Liability under the FCRA 
 The criminal provision of the FCRA has been used very rarely and there are few reported 
decisions discussing the requirements to establish liability for its violation.  The statute provides 
“[a]ny person who knowingly and willfully obtains information on a consumer from a consumer 
reporting agency under false pretenses shall be fined under Title 18, imprisoned for not more 
than 2 years, or both.”154  Importantly, the use of the word “willfully” in this section is not 
interpreted the same way as in the civil liability section.  In the same Supreme Court case that 
held willful conduct included reckless disregard in civil actions, the Court reaffirmed that, in the 
context of criminal statutes, willful still implies liability for knowing violations only.155  The 
requirement of false pretenses should be interpreted the same as it has been under the civil 
provisions; however, it has not come up frequently enough to know whether courts would treat 
the sections equivalently. 
 One case that has discussed this provision in some detail is United States v. Valenzeno.156  
In this case, a tax preparer was being charged both under the FCRA and the Hobbs Act for 
actions of extortion and deception.157  The defendant would obtain consumer reports on potential 
clients from Trans Union after they contacted him for tax assistance.158  His certification to the 
consumer reporting agency claimed he wanted to screen potential clients before extending credit 
to them.159  The government brought charges related to only two consumers but was not able to 
sustain its burden on either case.160  In the first charge, the defendant obtained a consumer report 
on an individual who contacted him for an appointment but failed to keep it and there was no 
further contact between the consumer and the defendant.161  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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was unwilling to find false pretenses in this situation under a “little-used” statute when the 
government could cite no authority in support.162  The court found it significant that the 
government could not produce evidence that the defendant made any particular assertion to 
Trans Union in obtaining the report, there was no actual harm and no effort to defraud this 
consumer.163  In the second charge, the defendant requested a consumer report under similar 
circumstances, but the government could not prove that he ever received the information.164  
 In another Sixth Circuit case, a defendant was charged with violating the criminal 
provision of the FCRA in obtaining consumer reports by posing as a paralegal for attorneys 
involved in debt collection.165  Though the outcome of the case is unknown, the court apparently 
thought the charges were strong enough to withstand three mistrials and the reported opinion 
remanded it to trial for another chance.166  An interesting twist on the criminal liability statute 
can be found in Commonwealth v. Source One Associates, Inc., where Massachusetts was 
pursing a civil enforcement action against a re-seller of financial information for violating state 
consumer protection laws.167  The court ordered the defendant to pay a civil penalty of $500,000 
for state law violations that were predicated on obtaining consumer reports under false pretenses 
in defiance of the FCRA.168  The defendant would receive requests for financial information on 
individuals from his clients.169  The first thing the defendant would do is retrieve the individual’s 
credit report.170  The finding of false pretenses was based primarily on the fact that the defendant 
never inquired into the purpose for which his clients wanted the information but he consistently 
represented to Equifax that the reports were being used “in connection with credit transactions 
involving the consumer.”171  In summary, although criminal enforcement under the FCRA has 
not been seen regularly in the past, it is never safe to assume that it will not become more 
popular in the future. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In a time of instant access to information, it is not surprising that everyone wants to be in 
the know, including attorneys.  However, when it comes to credit, financial and other 
information that may be contained in consumer reports, there can be a cost to not restraining 
one’s desire for such information.  The Fair Credit Reporting Act was enacted to ensure that 
everyone exercises their responsibilities under the Act “with fairness, impartiality, and a respect 
for the consumer's right to privacy.”172  Too many attorneys have discovered the hard way that 
individual credit reports are not just available for the taking.  There are very strict limitations on 
who can access these reports and for what purposes they may be used.  Unfortunately, the courts 
have created substantial confusion in this area of law by not reading all the provisions of the Act 
thoroughly.  Recent amendments to the Act have only added to the uncertainty and it is 
foreseeable that a major change in the Act’s interpretation could be on its way.  In the mean time, 
attorneys who wish to avoid liability should exercise sound judgment as to the necessity of 
seeking someone’s consumer report.  As always, attorneys must respect the balance Congress 
created between the goals of debt collectors and the privacy protections afforded to consumers 
by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  
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